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I. Introduction
A  large and growing literature has addressed the problem of valuing
nonmarket goods such as  recreational experiences,  scenic amenities, and
environmental quality  [see,  e.g. Freeman;  Smith et al.,  1986].  The
estimation of  these values involves  either an indirect approach based on
observed behavior, or  direct elicitation of values via sample  survey
methods. Existing tests  of the validity of the  techniques are  of three
kinds:  tests  in experimental markets, comparisons of alternative
approaches  to valuing the  same good, and, for the  indirect methods,  the
ability of the technique  to  "explain" variations in observed behavior  in
some statistical sense. In this paper we take a different approach to
testing the validity of  the  techniques based on their consistency with the
axioms of choice.
The valuation approaches  and/or their interpretation are based on an
assumption of  the  economic  "rationality"  of consumers.  In  this paper
rationality means that the observed quantities of the  goods  demanded at
various prices correspond to  those  that could be generated by a consumer
who  is maximizing her preference ordering on a budget  set. Using the
quantities  of goods  and  services purchased in the market and the quantities
of nonmarket goods and their pseudo-prices  generated by some valuation
technique, one can determine if the  quantities demanded at various "prices"
could have been purchased by a utility-maximizing  (rational) consumer.
Following the nonparametric demand approach set forth by Varian (1982),  we
2examine  the  prices and quantities for evidence of violations of the axioms
of choice  as  embodied in revealed preference theory.
This  study uses  individual  time  series observation of recreational
hunting behavior over a season and  the  travel cost and contingent valuation
approaches  to conduct revealed preference tests.  Also,  for those
individuals who violate revealed preference conditions, an efficiency index
(Afriat;  Varian, 1982)  is computed to determine  the  severity of the
violations.
Several such tests are undertaken. First, we  test  the travel choices
which underlie the travel cost model of recreation demand (see McConnell
for a description of this model).  We  treat each  trip taken by an individual
over  a recreation season as a separate choice occasion. The  "price"
(marginal value to  the individual)  of the recreation good is  not
observable, but the prices and quantities consumed of travel,  lodging, and
other market goods  associated with recreation trips  are known. Varian
(1987) shows  that if one set of prices  and/or quantities is  missing from
the data, then revealed preference theory cannot be used to  derive
restrictions  on the observable data which imply consistency with
rationality. However, in our case the price of the  recreation good is  a
marginal value per trip and the  quantity is  fixed at one unit per  trip.  In
this  instance the absence of this  one value from the  data does not  alter
conclusions regarding the consistency of the observed bundle with  the
axioms  of choice. This allows us  to  test the rationality of choices of
market goods associated with recreational travel.'
1Note  that this  is  somewhat different than the typical  travel  cost
model  in which the  quantity is  the  number of trips  over a season.  Here,
the  trips  define  independent consumption bundles.
3The statistical test we employ here  involves a small-sample  comparison
of the  number of revealed preference violations  in  the data versus  the
number in random choice data. As well, violations of the axioms  are studied
using a Probit analysis  in order  to test  two hypotheses:  that as  the
importance of making incorrect choices grows,  the  probability of making
them falls;  and that more complex decisions  involve more violations of  the
postulates of rationality.
One  of the  more controversial  issues in the use of travel cost models
is  the treatment of the value of time  (Smith et al.  1983;  Wilman;
Bockstael et al.).  Standard practice in this  regard is  to  employ some
fraction of the wage rate times  travel  time  as  a component of  the  travel
cost variable  (Cesario and Knetsch;  Walsh). We test the efficacy of
including time values in this manner by comparing the  number and extent of
violations of revealed preference theory across models with on-site and
travel time valued from zero  to  the full wage rate.
Our second set of analyses  incorporate non-market values into  the
consumption bundle via simple contingent valuation questions  (for a full
discussion of contingent valuation see  Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  The
questions ask  the amount  that a respondent would be willing to pay per  day
for the  recreational activities  they were observed to  choose. As well,
willingness to accept compensation for foregoing recreation  was elicited.
The contingent value then was used as  the price of recreation activities  in
the bundle of demanded goods,  where the quantity variable is  the number of
days of recreation on each  trip.
Our analyses  can be  given two  interpretations. First,  if  the validity
of the valuation methods  is  taken as  given, then we are  testing for  the
4rationality of the consumers  in our sample.  If such choices are  not
rational,  then the  use of the simple  travel  cost model might be questioned.
Or, more appropriately since we are not really testing the  travel  cost
model  (which has  as  the quantity variable the  number of trips  in a season),
we might question the rationality of choices regarding recreational travel.
Alternatively, we can operate under a maintained hypothesis of rationality
and test the ability of  the valuation method to capture  the  true values
generating the observed behavior. Of course,  if we find that few violations
of the theory occur, it  does not  imply that the computed values are true
ones;  it  just means  that the  computed values  are not so  at odds with the
true values that  they generate contradictions with the assumed rationality
of consumers. On the other hand, if large numbers of violations are found,
then either the techniques  are flawed in some general way, or the very
simple versions we employ are not adequate to  the  task and more complex
approaches should be tested.
This study provides weak favorable evidence for the consistency
between preference maximization behavior and nonmarket goods valuation
methods. Few violations of the axioms of choice are noted and when  they are
found, the efficiency indices  indicate  that observed choices  are not far
from rational  ones. The number of violations  does decline  significantly
with the inclusion of time values,  and very weak evidence is  found for  the
valuation of travel time  and on-site time  at the wage rate.  The  analysis of
violations using the Probit model confirms the hypotheses set  forth above:
there  is  a decreased probability of violations of  the axioms of choice as
the proportion of the budget spent on recreation increases  and an  increased
chance of violations as  the number of choices  increases. When the
5contingent valuation responses are used to  include  the nonmarket good  in
the consumption bundle tested, there are even fewer violations of  the
axioms than when only market goods  are  tested.
This  paper also represents one of the few attempts  (see also Koo;  and
Koo  and Hasenkamp) to  test the  rationality of observed behavior at the
individual level, at least in humans  (see Battalio et al.,  1981,  1986  for
tests of behavior in rats and pigeons) who  are not mentally  ill  (Battalio
et al.,  1973  tested an economy constructed in a mental  institution).  Most
empirical research in this  area has  employed aggregate data (e.g. Gross;
Chalfant and Alston), which one would not necessarily expect to  satisfy
axioms of individual choice.  In further work (Adamowicz and Graham-
Tomasi),  we explore  the way in which alternative approaches  to  aggregation
alter the number and extent of violations.
II. Nonmarket Valuation Methods
Even a partial review of the various  approaches  to  the valuation of
nonmarket goods  is beyond the  scope of this paper. Here, we merely sketch
the  issues  involved.
Let  the  consumers preferences  for  all  goods be  representable by a
utility function U*(N,R),  where N is  a vector of nonrecreation goods and R
is  a vector of leisure goods associated with recreation. The recreation
goods are assumed to be separable from the nonrecreation goods.  Hence, we
let U*(N,R)-U(N,U(R)),  where U(R) is  the subutility  function for the
recreation goods.  If U* is  increasing in its second argument for all values
of N, we  can treat U(R) as  a traditional utility function and all  of the
properties of classical demand theory carry over to  it  (Deaton and
6Muellbauer).  As well,  the demands  of a consumer maximizing a subutility
function U(R) subject  to  a budget constraint should satisfy  the axioms of
revealed preference theory applied solely to  the recreation branch.
The  subutility function for recreation can be written in more detail
as U(Rl,...,Rn,Z),  where Ri  is a market good associated with recreation,
such as  travel,  and Z is  a public or quasi-public good, i.e.  the  recreation
site and its  services. Let P be the vector of prices  that correspond to  the
market goods R and let q be  the  marginal value of the public good to  the
individual. The  individual's conditional  (on N)  indirect utility  function
for this branch can be written as V(P,Z,M),  where M  is  the money income
allocated to  consumption of recreational goods. Marginal willingness to pay
for  the public good Z is  given by
q  - av(.)/a
av(.)/aM
Total willingness to pay for a change  in Z would be  the  integral  of q over
the range  of variation of Z.
The problem of valuing nonmarket goods  is  to derive  mechanisms for
estimating marginal or  total willingness to pay functions.  Several
approaches  to  this  problem have been developed in the  literature. There are
two major classes of such approaches:  indirect and direct. The  indirect
methods seek to  infer the values by observation of behavior. In this  study,
travel behavior is used as  it can be employed to  deduce  the values of
unpriced recreational goods,  as described by the  literature on the  travel
cost model of  recreation demand. The direct methods,  known generally as
contingent valuation, involve asking individuals via sample  surveys their
valuations of changes  in  the  quantity of the nonmarket good.
7Travel Cost
The  travel cost model had its  origins in a letter from Harold
Hotelling  to  the U.S. National  Park Service  in  1947. Hotelling proposed
that the value of a recreation site could be determined by using travel
cost  to  the  site as  a proxy for a price  and the number of trips  to  the  site
as a quantity variable. The modern approach is  to derive  a statistical
relationship between the number of visits and the  travel costs  for each
individual  and perhaps some other variables, with the  site value being
given by consumer surplus, or perhaps  a Hicksian welfare measure  derived
from the demand function.
Thus, let Rj  be the round-trip miles chosen on a choice occasion
(trip)  to a site and let  Pj  be the  price of travel per mile. The variation
in travel costs  to  any site across a sample of individuals  can be  used to
estimate a demand function for numbers of visits to  a site over a season by
an individual as a function of travel costs,  e.g.
Vs - f(RjPj,  m),
where vs  is  the number of visits  to  site s in a season and m is  income
allocated to  the recreation branch. The consumer surplus calculated from
estimates  of this  demand function give the value of the  recreation site,
i.e.  Z in the model above.
The basic assumptions of the  simple  travel cost model  are  that:  (i)
individuals treat changes  in the unobserved entrance fee  for  the  site and
the cost of travel identically,  (ii)  the  only purpose of the  trip is
recreation at  the  site,  (iii)  individuals spend and equal and fixed amount
of time at the  site,  and  (iv) no substitutes  for  the  site exist.  Each of
these assumptions has been relaxed to  some extent in  the  literature  (see,
8e.g.  Smith).
Among the more  important and controversial  issues  in the estimation of
the travel cost model  is  the  selection of values for travel and on-site
time.  Time spent recreating has  an opportunity cost and thus  we expect  its
value to  influence recreation choices.  If such values are nonzero  and are
not included in the analysis, biased estimates of site value may result
(Cesario).
The appropriate valuation of time depends critically on the
constraints that individuals  are supposed to  face on their choice
occasions  (Bockstael, et al.).  If all time  can be  substituted across
activities freely, then the opportunity cost of all time  is  the wage rate.
But leisure  time may be allocated to number of activities which may or may
not (especially in the short run) directly conflict with  time allocated to
generating income. The relationship between time spent recreating and time
spent working generally will vary across trips  as well as  individuals,  e.g.
some are taken during vacations and others  involve  time off from work paid
at an hourly rate.  As well,  the disutility associated with travel may vary
across  trips  to  different  sites  (Wilman). And how time spent at the  site
should be valued relative to  time  spent traveling remains unclear.  In
general, one can say that time values will differ across  individuals  in the
sample, across  trips  and sites  for  the  same individual,  and will be  given
by some non-linear function of the wage  rate  (Smith, et al.,  1983).  As may
be expected, the empirical studies  are far removed from the  theoretical
models.  It is  standard practice to  treat all individuals  and trips  the
same,  to  ignore  on-site time,  and to  multiply travel  time by a fraction of
the wage  (usually 1/4  to 1/2  based on time values revealed by commuting
9behavior,  see McConnell and Strand for an estimate  for recreation data),
and add this  to  the  travel  cost variable. In this analysis we  investigate
several choices  for the value of time using the standard approach and  the
effect of such values on the correspondence between observed choices and
postulates of utility maximizing behavior.
Contingent Valuation
In order to  develop a demand curve for public goods Ciriacy-Wantrup
suggested in 1952  that  individuals be asked survey questions  to elicit
values for successive additional quantities  of such goods.  This suggestion
was  first acted upon by Davis and has  since seen considerable refinement
under the rubric of contingent valuation.
In its most basic form contingent valuation involves  a single  open-
ended question regarding willingness to pay for hypothetical changes  in
provision of  a public good, with payments made via some vehicle such as
"higher prices or  taxes."  Other approaches entail closed ended "take  it or
leave  it"  questions, with the  offered value varied across  the  sample;  these
can be assessed in a referendum format as  well. Or, bidding games  can be
employed in which closed-ended questions are asked, but the postulated
payment level  is  changed within each  interview to  establish the value  at
which the response changes  from payment to  nonpayment (or vice versa).
The contingent valuation technique  is extremely flexible, but
potentially suffers  from a number of theoretical  and practical
difficulties. Notable here are  the opportunities for strategic behavior
identified by Samuelson;  the inability to  define the  good sufficiently well
to allow all respondents  to value the good the  good the  analyst wishes  to
10value;  the carefulness with which the respondent  gives values when the
exercise  is hypothetical;  and the ability  to alter valuations by
modifications of the  survey instrument. Notable  in the latter category are
modifications  to  the  payment vehicle,  the starting points of bidding games,
or the  types of  information provided about the target good and/or related
goods. As well,  the  large differences between willingness to  pay and
willingness to  accept compensation responses  discovered in the empirical
literature  remain controversial.  For full  treatments of these and other
issues concerning the  use of contingent valuation methods  see Mitchell and
Carson, and Cummings  et al.
III. Revealed Preference
The theory of revealed preference has  its  roots in Samuelson's  (1948)
attempt to  find minimal conditions under which price and quantity bundles
could be used to  construct a preference ordering which would "rationalize"
these data. The  question is,  can a preference ordering be  constructed from
the data such that a consumer acting under this  preference order would
choose the same  consumption bundles  as  the  original data?
Houthakker proved that, under conditions of continuity of  the
derivatives of the demand function with respect to prices and income and
single-valuedness of demands,  the strong axiom of revealed preference
(SARP) implies  the  "utility rationality" of consumers.  That is,  that there
exists  a numerical function of goods  such that,  for  all other bundles  in a
given budget set, the  demanded bundle  yields at  least  as  high a value  of
the  function, and that this  relationship holds  for  all budgets.
Houthakker's assumptions have been weakened. Given a nonsatiated consumer
11who satisfies  SARP, convexity of the  set of all bundles chosen for  some
budget, and a closed demand set for each budget, Richter showed that a
real-valued function can be  found which acts as  a utility function for  this
consumer.  Varian (1982) provided a further modification of the  axioms of
choice,  called the generalized axiom of revealed preference  (GARP).  This
allows multi-valued demands generated by  indifference curves with "flat
spots."  The  SARP does not admit utility functions that are not strictly
quasi-concave.
More formally, let p be an nxl price vector and  let B be a family of
budgets defined as  b-(x:  xeX & px < m),  where X  is  the consumption set and
m >  0 is  income. A consumer is said to be rational if there exists  a binary
relation R such that the bundle chosen from the budget  "maximizes"  this
preference relation as
h(b) - (x:  xEb & for all yeb,  xRy)
for all b  in B. The bundle x is called the demand for  the consumer. If
there exists a real-valued function u(x) such that xRy holds if and only if
u(x) 2 u(y)  the  consumer  is said to be  representable by the  function u(x).
Let Q be a binary relation such that xQy if and only if there exists  a
budget b such that xeh(b)  and py c px with xoy. This  relation states  that x
is  chosen when y is  available. The weak axiom of revealed preference
states  that if xoy, then xQy implies not yQx. This  is stated as  "x is
directly revealed preferred to y."  A cycle of binary relations of  the  form
QxQxQ 2 ...Qy for  some finite sequence  of intermediate bundles xi indicates
that  "x is  revealed preferred to  y," with he word directly dropped. This
can be rewritten as xHy;  H is  called the  transitive  closure of Q. Varian
(1982) provides  algorithms for computing the  transitive  closure of such
12relations. The  SARP states  that, if xoy, then xHy implies not yHx. The  GARP
states  that, if xHy then it  is not the  case that py > px.  Thus,  the GARP
states  that if x is  revealed preferred to y then there cannot exist  a
situation  in which y is  "strictly"  revealed preferred to  x.  The  strict
inequality in the  last part  of the  definition indicates that multivalued
demands  functions may satisfy the GARP.
One  case that  is not investigated by any of these axioms  is  one  in
which the prices change but the consumption bundle does not. This may be
due  to kinks  in indifference curves,  or nonconvexities  in  the choice  set.
This may also be a sign of uncertainty or a lack of information about  the
goods purchased, or operation of a habit effect.
The  tests of consistency with revealed preference axioms are  all or
none tests since a consumer either satisfies the axioms  or not. Varian
(1985) introduced the notion that measurement errors  in the data could be
used to  test whether the unobserved true structure violates the axioms when
they are violated in the observed system. Statistical tests have been
proposed by Varian (1985),  by Epstein and Yatchew, and by Tsur.  Koo  (1963)
has proposed some non-statistical  tests  such as  the maximal subset of
observations  that satisfy the axioms. As well,  one might make comparisons
of observed data to  the number of violations expected in random choices;
this  latter  test is  employed below.
In order to measure  the severity of violations  of the axioms we use an
approach proposed by Varian  (1987).  Let the binary relation Qe be written
as  xQey if and only if epx >  py and xoy with e in the  interval  [0,1].  The
transitive closure  of the relation Qe  is  defined by the relation He . Now,
analogues  to  SARP and GARP can be  defined using the  relation He.  If e-l
13then we are  returned to  the  original definition of SARP and GARP. However,
if e is  less  than 1 we are reducing the  size of  the budget set on  the  left
hand side of the  directly revealed preferred relation.  The number e is
calculated as the value that minimizes  (l-e) subject to satisfying SARPe or
GARPe.  Thus,  e can be used as a scalar efficiency index of the severity of
the original violation of the  SARP or GARP, with large values of e
indicating that only small reductions  in the budget will lead to
consistency of the data with the  axioms of choice.
An example  of the  efficiency index is provided in Figure 1. The solid
lines  indicate the actual budgets  for the consumer and  the squares on the
graph are the bundles consumed. This combination of budgets and bundles
violates the axioms of choice because in both cases one bundle was chosen
while the other was  available. The dotted lines  indicate  the reduced
budgets  that lead to  satisfaction of the axioms,  the amount of the
reduction being measured by the index e described above.
IV. Procedures and Results
The  data used in this  analysis are from a mail,  recall survey of
Bighorn sheep hunters  in Alberta, Canada, collected  in  1982. A more
complete description of the data, details  of all of the empirical  routines
used here, as well as  some additional analyses,  are available in Adamowicz
(1988). A total of 621 respondents were sampled, but missing data results
in a reduction in the useful sample to  343  individuals.
The data include  the hunting activity on each  trip  (destination, miles
traveled, activity duration in days,  size of party, game  sought, game
bagged) and expenditures on  travel,  lodging, food, and other hunting-
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Figure  1:  Scalar Efficiency  Index  Example
15related items.  In order to derive a price measure  for each trip,  the
expenditure and party size data were used to determine  an effective price
to  an individual. The procedures rely on averaging costs  over the party,
which may or may not be  appropriate, but  the available data did not allow
more refined individual  price estimates  to be determined.2
Nonparametric Analyses of Market Data
In this  section of the  paper we study the rationality of the purchases
of markets  goods associated with travel  for hunting. As  mentioned above,
the value of the  site  is missing from the data, but since  the quantity  is
fixed at one unit per  trip, violations of the axioms of choice would not be
changed by the inclusion of the price of this  single fixed quantity.
Nine nonparametric tests  of the market data were performed,  the nine
differing regarding the value of time.  In order to  incorporate  the value
of time,  both the wage rate  and 1/2  the wage rate were used, as well  as no
time values.  The wage  rate was calculated as  income  divided by 280  days  of
work per year  for 8 hours per day.  Income was elicited by categories with
the midpoint of each category used here. This  is a simplified approach for
determining hourly wages  (though a common one  in such studies) which more
complete data may reveal  to be  inappropriate. We began with only the market
goods data with no values of  travel or on-site  time. Next, the  additional
cost per mile was calculated by dividing  the hourly wage  (or 1/2 of  it)  by
2The revealed preference  tests require observations  of choices under
at least two  budgets.  Computation of expenditures per person per trip
reveals considerable variation over the  different  trips over a season.
While most of the variation in prices over a season  is  due  to  differences
in party size, we cannot guarantee that  identical goods are purchased on
different trips.  As well, recall data may exhibit errors of measurement
that generate specious  differences  in budgets.
16an average traveling speed of 50 miles per hour. The  implicit price  of on-
site time was  included by using the wage  rate  (or 1/2  of  it)  times  the
number of work hours per  day, assumed to be 8. The  quantity of  site time
was  days on site.
The number of violations of the  axioms of choice for  the nine
different approaches to generating the implicit prices of travel  are
presented in Table 1.  In general, agreement with the theory of revealed
preference appears to be quite close, with nearly 95%  of the  individuals
satisfying the axioms of choice  for all models.  In all  of the  tests there
were no  cases in which  the GARP was satisfied but the SARP was  not,
indicating that there were no flat spots  in the  indifference curves.
As a standard of comparison, we use  the number of violations of the
axioms  that would appear  in random choice data. Note  that the number of
hunting trips  reported is fairly small, ranging  from one  to  seven per
individual. Clearly, with only one trip no violations of the axioms are
possible. In order to examine the  small sample aspects of the  test a
series of simulations were performed with randomly generated numbers  for
the prices and quantities used in revealed preference  tests. These  are
presented in Table 2, where the  rows are the  number of choice  occasions and
the columns  are the number of commodities  in the bundle being examined. The
elements of  the  table  are the percentage of cases violating  the GARP  or the
SARP  (in the generation of the budgets  no cases arose  in which GARP was
satisfied but SARP was  not).  It  is  clear that in small samples,  randomly
generated budgets  can satisfy the  axioms in a significant proportion of
cases.
The percentage of cases  which violate  the  axioms  is  far  larger than
17Table  i.  Results  of  Nonparametric  Tests:  Value  of  Travel  and  On Site  Time Models
Value of  Value of  On  Site Time Travel
Time
___  __--_ 
--------------  ----________
zero  .5 x  1.0  x
wage  wage
zero  Violations  14  2  1 Percent Violating  4.08  0.58  0.29 X violating  (multiple trips)'  5.30  0.76  0.38 Equal con. spot  cases'  113  113  113 No.  of  trips evaluated  1125  1125  1125
.5  x  Violations  7  5  1 wage
Percent  Violating  2.04  1.46  0.29 X violating  (multiple  trips)'  2.65  1.89  0.38 Equal  con.  spot  cases'  113  113  113 No. of  trips  evaluated  1125  1125  1125
1.0  x  Violations  7  5  2 wage
Percent  Violating  2.04  1.46  0.58 X violating  (multiple  trips)'  2.65  1.89  0.76 Equal con.  spot  cases'  113  113  113 No.  of  trips  evaluated  1125  1125  1125
Single  trip cases  automatically  satisfy  the  axioms,  this  figure indicates  the  percentage  of  multi-trip  responses  which  violate the axioms.
'  Cases  with  equal  consumption  spots  are  those  which  the  prices change  but  the  consumption  bundle  remains  constant.
18Table 2.  Percentages of  Cases Violating the AxiomsO  of  Choice
from Randomly Generated Budgetst
Number of  Number  in  the  Commodity Bundle
Bundles  1  2  3  4  5
1  0  0  0  0  0
2  0  9  10  15  12
3  0  21  32  29  26
4  0  31  41  39  44
5  0  53  58  65  59
6  0  65  71  75  81
7  0  73  79  82  77
8  0  76  88  94  89
9  0  82  95  93  95
10  0  88  95  97  98
There were no differences between  the  results  for  the GARP and
the SARP thus  these results  represent violations  of  both axioms.
19the  corresponding numbers  in  the observed travel data  for all nine models.
Statistical tests of the significance of  the difference  in  the  numbers of
violations  (see Adamowicz,  1988,  for details)  lead to  rejection of the  null
hypothesis of no  difference  in the  number of violations at very high levels
of significance. Thus, under a maintained hypothesis that the prices used
are true prices, we  conclude that consumers  do behave in a manner
consistent with utility theory in their choices  regarding recreational
travel.
An interesting finding is  that nearly one-third of  the  individuals
displayed some evidence of not reacting to  price changes due  to kinks  in
indifference curves or nonconvexities  in the  choice set.  The  latter
interpretation is  especially compelling in the current context since
hunting can take place only at a finite  set  of sites.
There  is  no clear pattern in the way that the violations change over
the values of time,  except that the model without any time values does  not
perform as well as the models with time values  included. A simple two-way
classification table can be  constructed which allows for a statistical
comparison of the number of violations under alternative  time value
assumptions. A contingency table with time value alternatives on one  axis
and violations or non-violations  on the other axis serves  as  the basis  for
a Chi-square  test of the difference between groups.  Let n be  the  total
number of  individuals in both groups,  1 refers  to violations of axioms, 2
to  their satisfaction, a refers  to  the first  implicit price approach and b
to  the second.  For example, nl  is  the number of individuals  in total who
violate  the axioms, na the number of  individuals tested using the  first
implicit price approach and al  the number of observed violations  using the
20first approach, etc.  The appropriate test statistic  is
k . n(alb2  - a2l112
nln2nanb
The statistic k is  distributed as  a Chi-square variate with 1 degree of
freedom (Spiegel). Table 3 contains the  results of selected tests between
the various models.
The results of these tests  of proportions  indicate  that models with
positively-valued on-site  time  tend to have significantly different numbers
of violations  than models with no value of on-site time.  However, the
models with on-site  time valued at 1/2  the wage  is  not significantly
different (at  the 95%  level)  than the one with travel  time valued at 1/2
the wage. It  is  important to note  that different individuals violated the
axioms for different values of time,  indicating that approaches which
assume the same  fraction of the wage across all  individuals are  incorrect.
Further evidence regarding the value of time  is provided by the
efficiency indices for  the violators in the various models  as presented in
Table 4. These indices  show that the  efficiencies for  the different models
do not always agree with the numbers  of violations.  Combining the numbers
of violations with the efficiencies seems  to  indicate  that a conservative
approach (one  that gives a lower estimate of surplus),  which yields  few
violations of the axioms  of choice and high efficiencies for  the
violations  that do occur, is  to value travel  time at zero and on-site  time
at the wage rate. However, valuing both types  of time at the wage  rate
gives  the same  revealed preference  results.  In general,  the performance of
values of  travel  time  seem to be more volatile  across values  of on-site
time than  is  the performance of on-site time  across values of  travel  time.
21Table  3.  Statistical Test'  of  the Comparison of  the Number  of
Violations Between Models
Comparison  Chi  Squared  P-Value
Value
TT-0,  ST-0  vs  TT-.5,  ST-0  2.407  .121
TT-0, ST-0 vs  TT-1,  ST-0  2.407  .121
TT-O,  STO0  vs  TT-0, ST..5  9.215  .002
TTI0, ST-0  vs TT-.5, ST-.5  4.385  .036
TT-.5,  ST=0 vs TT-.5,  ST-.5  0.339  .560
TT-.5, ST-0 vs TT-0,  ST-.5  2.815  .093
Chi  Squared test  statistic.
-^TT-O  indicates  travel  time value of  zero,  TT-.5  indicates travel  time value of  .5  times the wage,  TT-1  indicates travel time value of  1.0  times the wage.  ST-0  indicates  site time value of  zero, ST-.5 indicates  site time value of  .5  times  the wage and ST-1  indicates  site  time value of  1.0  times the  wage.
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23Violations  of the  axioms may be due  to measurement errors  in the  data,
misspecification of the  separable structure  of the utility function, or
other reasons  including, of course,  "irrational" behavior by  individuals.
While rational choice is  expected in a world of perfect information and
zero computational costs, in more complex milieus a more careful definition
of rationality is needed which allows  the balancing of the marginal
benefits and marginal costs of acquiring and processing information. One
would expect that  as  the  "cost" of making  irrational choices increases
their frequency would decline. Therefore, we hypothesize  that as  the
expenditure on the recreation branch increases  as  a proportion of  income,
the number of violations  for that branch would fall.  As well, when
decisions  are more complex, we would expect that the number of violations
of narrowly-defined rationality postulates would increase. Thus, we also
hypothesize that  the number of violations of the axioms would increase with
the number of choice occasions  or trips  that the person takes.
In order to  test  these hypotheses a Probit model was estimated with a
dependent variable equal  to  1 if the  individual violated the  axioms and
equal  to 0 if they did not. The results of  the model, estimated with zero
value of on-site  and travel  time, are presented in Table 5. In the
estimated model the independent variables are  the number of choice
occasions  (trips) and proportion of  income spent  on recreation. The  results
confirm our conjectures regarding the  influence of  these variables  on the
probability of violating the  axioms.
Contingent Valuation
In this  section we  add the value of  the recreation experience to  the
24Table  5.  Probit  Analysis  of  Axiom  violations
Std. Variable  Coeff.  Error  t-Stat  P-Value
Constant  -2.252  0.083  -2.707  0.007 Trips  1.112  0.413  2.695  0.007 Expon/Inc  -0.281  0.152  -1.845  0.065
Observations:  343
Log-Likelihood:  -52.587
25travel consumption bundle evaluated in the previous  section. We  do this by
valuing the public input  (i.e.  the  recreation site)  using contingent
valuation questions regarding the willingness to pay  (WTP) per  day for  the
consumption bundle observed. We explore  as well  as  the use of willingness
to  accept compensation (WTA) for foregoing this bundle. We  then seek to
determine if the  individuals could have paid this  amount for  their hunting
experience and maintained rationality as  defined by satisfaction of
revealed preference axioms. Three basic approaches are used:  the answer to
the WTP and WTA questions  and the prediction of a bid function estimated
from the WTA responses.  Efficiency indices  also are computed for those
individuals who violate the axioms.
The WTP question was of the form "What was  it worth to you in dollars
per day, above what you spent on travel  and other expenses,  to participate
in hunting."  The WTA question was "How much would you have  to be paid not
to hunt for one year."  Both of these appeared on the  same questionnaire as
that used to collect  the data employed in the  last section. The WTP
response provides a "price"  that can be  used directly in the nonparametric
analysis. The WTA response was converted to  a price per day by dividing by
the activity days of participation in the  season for each individual. The
quantities  corresponding to  these  prices are the number of days  spent on
the  trip.
Of the  343  respondents who provided complete trip activity and
expenditure  data, 223 provided WTP values and 148  provided WTA values.
Although the appropriate treatment of nonresponses  to contingent valuation
questions  is  a controversial topic  (Mitchell and Carson),  those who did
not respond to  these questions were dropped  from further consideration.
26Tables 6 and 7 contain the WTP and WTA results respectively. In  Tables
8 and 9 these results are presented by hunting zone  (site).  These  results
show that there  is  considerable variation  in the  contingent valuation
responses, with standard deviations larger than the mean. The ratio of the
WTA to  WTP responses  is  1.72. This  is not  as  large a difference as  has been
reported in other studies  (see Cummings, et al.)  although  the difference
here is  statistically significant.
An alternative approach to  determining the price from  the contingent
valuation responses  is  to  estimate a bid function for  the good  in question
(see e.g. Sellar, Stoll,  and Chavas;  Cameron).  Here, we  estimate a bid
function from the WTA responses for values  for  the  season of hunting as  a
function of the number of days of activity. The estimated equation, using
natural logarithms of the variables,  is
ln(WTA) - 4.762  +  0.8161n(DAYS)  R2-.219 N-148
(17.6)  (6.4)
The numbers  in parentheses are t-statistics.
The marginal value per day of activity can be derived from the  bid
function and used as  an implicit price  for the observed quantity of days in
the nonparametric analysis. The results of the  revealed preference tests
are presented in Table  10. As with the  market data analyses described
above, there were no cases  in which the GARP was  satisfied but the  SARP was
not, while there  is  considerable evidence of kinks  in the indifference
curves  or nonconvexities  in the  choice set. As well, very few violations of
the axioms  of choice are noted, with the  fewest over all our  tests  yielded
by the WTA-bid function approach.  The efficiency  indices  for those
violating are presented in Table  11.
A test  statistic similar to  that presented above regarding the
27Table  6.  Willingness  to  Pay  (WTP) Descriptive  Statistics  for  Individuals  Reporting  WTP
Mean  Std.  Dev.
No.  of cases  223
No.  of  Trips per  season  4.336  1.790 No.  of Days per  trip  3.10  3.46 WTP per person per day  87.90  122.62
Table  7.  Willingness  to Accept Compensation  (WTAC) Descriptive  Statistics  for Individuals  Reporting WTAC
Mean  Std.  Dev.
No. of  cases  148
No.  of Trips  per  season  4.371  1.762 No. of Days  per  trip  3.00  3.61 WTAC per  person  per  day  151.57  216.06
28Table  8.  Willingness  to  Pay  (WTP)
Descriptive Statistics for  Individuals  Reporting WTP by  Zone
Mean  Std. Dev.
ZONE  11
No.  of  cases  88
No.  of  Trips per season  1.919  1.259
No.  of Days per  trip  2.55  1.89
WTP per person per  day  90.01  143.52
ZONE  10
No. of cases  73
No. of  Trips per  season  2.726  1.726
No. of  Days per  trip  4.28  7.39
WTP per person  per day  88.37  144.17
ZONE  9
No.  of cases  65
No.  of Trips per  season  1.785  1.096
No.  of Days per trip  3.25  2.53
WTP per  person per day  101.46  151.15
ZONE 7
No.  of cases  73
No.  of Trips per season  1.643  0.962
No. of  Days per trip  3.97  3.02
WTP per  person per day  95.62  137.99
ZONE 6
No.  of  cases  27
No.  of Trips  per season  1.370  0.839
No.  of  Days per trip  6.89  4.03
WTP per  person per day  116.48  184.99
ZONE  5
No. of cases  51
No. of Trips per season  1.804  1.265
No.  of Days per  trip  3.36  2.65
WTP per  person  per  day  89.41  141.01
29Table 9.  Willingness  to Accept Compensation  (WTAC) Descriptive  Statistics  for  Individuals Reporting WTAC by  Zone
Mean  Std. Dev. --- __--_  --  -- __  __  _  -- __--------------
ZONE  11
No.  of  cases  56
No.  of  Trips per  season  1.821  1.162 No.  of Days  per trip  2.31  1,62 WTAC per person per day  149.16  250.19
ZONE  10
No.  of cases  47
No.  of Trips per  season  2.659  1.723
No. of  Days  per  trip  4.63  9.04 WTAC per person per day  131.34  143.74
ZONE 9
No. of cases  49
No. of Trips per  season  2.020  1.314 No.  of Days per trip  3.12  2.56 WTAC per person per day  217.07  350.92
ZONE 7
No. of cases  56
No.  of Trips per  season  1.553  0.971 No. of Days per trip  3.87  3.13 WTAC per person per day  104.57  137.54
ZONE 6
No. of  cases  20
No. of  Trips per  season  1.100  0.308
No.  of  Days per trip  6.10  3.57 WTAC per  person per day  132.29  159.73
ZONE  5
No.  of cases  41
No. of  Trips per  season  1.707  1.167 No.  of Days per trip  3.61  2.87 WTAC  per person  per day  100.77  103.13
30Table  10.  Results of  Nonparametric Tests:  Contingent Valuation
Form
CV WTP  Cases Evaluated  223
Violations  2
Percent Violating  0.90
X violating  (multiple trips)'  1.19
Equal con.  spot cases'  72
No. of  trips evaluated  706
CV WTAC  Cases Evaluated  148
Violations  1
Percent Violating  0.67
X violating  (multiple trips)'  0.88
Equal con.  spot cases'  43
No. of  trips evaluated  456
BID FN s Cases Evaluated  148
Violations  0
Percent Violating  0.00
X violating  (multiple trips)'  0.00
Equal con. spot  cases'  43
No.  of  trips evaluated  456
' Single trip cases automatically satisfy the axioms;  this  figure
indicates the percentage of multi-trip responses which violate
the axioms.
2  Cases with equal consumption  spots are  those which  the  prices
change but  the consumption bundle  remains constant.
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a.  " 4 statistical significance of differences between the  travel  cost models may
be used here  to  test  the  difference between  the violations in  the
contingent valuation models and the  travel  cost violations. Compared to a
travel cost model with no value of time  included, all  three of the
contingent valuation approaches result in significantly fewer violations.
The  contingent valuation approaches compared very favorably to  the best-
performing travel market data models  in terms  of consistency with the
axioms  of choice. Comparison of the WTP and WTA methods revealed no
significant differences between them in this  regard.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed an alternative approach to  the
validation of methods  for valuing nonmarket goods.  Our approach  is based on
the ability of the techniques  to provide  implicit prices for the nonmarket
goods which, when combined with observed quantities of  these and other
goods,  yield bundles  that could have been purchased by a rational
consumer. This  is  a very weak test of  the methods,  since there  is  no
guarantee that even if the prices are consistent with rationality  they are
the correct prices. But it  is a fundamental  test, since  if the  prices so
derived could not have been used by a rational consumer maximizing any
utility function, the techniques  are questionable  indeed.
In general,  the travel cost and contingent valuation methods used here
performed admirably. Since the models  are very simple ones  relative to
approaches exhibited in the  literature,  it may be that more sophisticated
versions would do even better, though they may do worse  if  individuals  are
not sophisticated decision-makers. However, it  also  is  the case  that  the
33goods we evaluated, travel  for hunting and hunting sites,  are  fairly well-
suited to  the assumptions made  in the  techniques.  The  approach we employ
might usefully be applied to more complex valuation problems.
One other alternative use of  revealed preference  theory may exist  in
this  context. Suppose  that individuals  are rational and that the  only
missing data for  the recreation (or other public good) branch is  the price
of the public good Z. Then one could compute the minimum and maximum
prices consistent with satisfaction of the  axioms  of choice for each
individual and these could serve directly as  goods valuations. The primary
problem with this  approach is  its maintained hypotheses:  that the  correct
separability structure is known, that no measurement errors  exist  in the
data, and that the consumers are  rational in their other goods purchases.
However,  the approach may be of some value and warrants further research.
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